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This paper presents the research design and some results of a 
comparative analysis of the value systems of 24 European 
countries. The data used are from two sets. The first is the 1990 
World Values Survey. This survey included 50 countries, of which 
30 were, at least partly, in Europe. We had to leave out six of 
them: Switzerland and Slovenia, as the data were not available; 
Turkey and Iceland, the far North-Western and South-Eastern 
corners, as we judged them to be too much special cases, outliers; 
and the two Irelands, as their value system proved to be so much 
dominated by religiosity that it was not possible to perform the 
type of analysis we were conducting. The analysis thus included 
the following countries: France, Britain, West Germany, Italy , the 
Netherlands, Denmark, Belgium, Spain, Hungary , Norway, Sweden, 
Finland, Poland, Belarus, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Bulgaria, 
Portugal, Austria, Moscow, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Russia. (1) 
The other data source were the national representative surveys 
conducted by the Center for Value Sociology of the Hungarian 
Academy of Sciences, led by Elemer Hankiss and Robert Manchin, 
in 1977-8, 1982, 1990 and 1993.
Theoretical Framework
In our view, the sociology of values suffers from the fact that 
interest in the field was divided in the past into two, unconnected 
if not hostile camps. One was the mainstream, structural- 
functionalist sociology whose central concern, following Durkheim 
and Parsons, were values interpreted as integrative social norms. 
This approach of general theory' was not well amenable to 
empirical anatysis, and this was only' reinforced by the 
Durkheimian hostility to "individualism". On the other side, it was 
attacked as "idealist" by the very' influential Marxising currents in 
sociology'. The other perspective was psychological, represented 
by Maslow’s theory' of the hierarchy of needs, or the works of 
Allport and Rokeach. This fitted much better with the methods of 
empirical analysis, but had the opposite deficiencies; it was too 
individualistic, did not connect well to general sociological 
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Our suggestion is that by a switch of perspective at the very 
foundations of the sociology of values, it is possible to work out a 
theoretical framework that is sensitive to historical and macro 
sociological considerations, amenable for empirical study, and 
instead of being for or against individualism gives an account why 
values, as opposed to norms, could and should be studied through 
individual value preferences.
The approach suggested is based on the following consideration. 
So far, the sociology of values started with the positive assertion 
of values or norms that were presumed to determine conduct. 
This approach was liable to become dogmatic and apologetic, 
stating either plain truisms about universal human or social 
"needs" for consensus, or legitimising existing norms due to their 
functional role. However, we get a different and historically 
sensitive perspective if we do not set out to discover eternally 
existing and universally valid norms, but concentrate on those 
historical moments when a social order is dissolving. Such an 
event not only renders norms visible, but also poses the actual 
problem of the establishment of norms, of the restoration of order 
as a top priority'. Looking at in this manner, we arrive at a period 
that is both historically and theoretically crucial for the study of 
values, the axial age. (2)
During a relatively short time period centring around 6th BC. a 
major spiritual renewal occurred simultaneously in India, China, 
Israel, Persia, and Greece, laying the foundations of all current 
world religions and philosophies, in response to a situation of 
widespread political, social and spiritual unrest. (3) A central 
element of the responses was the idea that due to the collapse of 
existing arrangements, individuals should not only be protected 
and consoled under such conditions of distress, but that the locus 
of order should be shifted from the whole community, its customs 
and laws, to the inside of the individuals. It is the individual, its 
conscience, its soul, its values that should be made into the new, 
unshakeable axis of the world. Hence the term "axial age", and 
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The axial age refers to one historical period, the period to which 
such highly influential thinkers as Weber, Nietzsche, Voegelin, 
Mumford, or Foucault have all returned. (4) But the limitation in 
time and place can be erased if we conceptually extend the period 
by coining the term "axial moment". An axial moment occurs 
whenever there is a global collapse of the established order of 
things, including the political system, the social order of everyday 
life and the system of beliefs - a very rare event -, and a major 
spiritual revival that as an answer locates the source of order 
inside the individuals. Such a period happened in the first 
centuries (collapse of the Roman republic and rise of Christianity), 
in the 5-7th centuries (collapse of the Roman Empire and rise of 
Islam), in the 15-16th centuries (the waning of the Middle Ages, 
Renaissance and Protestantism), and finally the two major stages 
of the dissolution of absolutist politics and the traditional 
European social order, Enlightenment and socialism.
The last three axial moments, the sources of modern democracy, 
Protestantism, the Enlightenment and socialism have certain 
distinctive features. Each were associated not only with a major 
revolution, but also with a short but highly influential period of 
ideological terror (the puritan "saints" in England, the Jacobins in 
France, Stalinism in Russia), and were also contemporaneous with 
the three major stages of the development of the extra-legal state 
mechanism, absolutism, the Enlightened absolutism and fascism. 
Taken together, all European countries were covered, at least in 
one moment of their history, by these mechanisms of ideological 
terror and state absolutism, with the singular exception of Ireland. 
Apart from axiality proper, the traces of these events should also 
be present in the respective value systems.
A conceptualisation of history as the succession of axial moments 
gives us a clue for the empirical analysis of social values. Axial 
belief systems, as opposed to traditional social norms, can be 
studied by an analysis of individual values, even through 
sociological surveys, as they only work to the extent that 
individuals actively reflect on them, form their identity around 
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operation and effort from the respondents, a special kind of 
"reflexive survey method". Finally, the current value systems in 
any axial civilisation or country will be the actual product of the 
different, still present layers of axial development. A proper study 
of values therefore not only can take individuals as its objects of 
analysis, but it also must take them seriously as reflecting 
subjects.
Methods
A fundamental methodological consequence of this perspective is 
that instead of studying individual values, or even groups of 
values, brought together on the basis of theoretical and empirical 
considerations, like factor analysis, it is necessary to study value 
or subjectivity types. This means that the basis units of analysis 
will not be variables but cases, individual respondents. The aim is 
to find out whether there are groups of people who share 
similarities in the selection of all their values. Such an analysis of 
types or forms of subjectivity has the additional benefit that it can 
be connected to those, quite influential theoretical approaches that 
place the emphasis on "types of man" or "forms of subjectivity", 
like Nietzsche, Weber or Foucault.
This perspective is defined as q-analysis. However, instead of 
using the methods of q-analysis proper, we opted for cluster 
analysis that suited our purposes better. (5)
On the Rokeach test
In comparative research on social values, the Inglehart test is the 
most widely used measure. The World Value Survey also offers 
the possibility of doing comparative work on a wide range of 
diverse items. However, our prior studies have convinced us that 
there is an excellent value test that combines the advantage of a 
highly sophisticated in depth psychological perspective with the 
possibility of analysing social values. This is the test developed by 
the American social psychologist Milton Rokeach. (6) Rokeach 
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corresponding to the ends - means distinction, asking respondents 
to rank separately the two sets of values from 1 to 18. The 
Appendix contains the exact wording of the test.
The merits of the Rokeach test are usually recognised, though it is 
often accused of being too general, ahistorical and abstract, while 
the values of individuals are assumed to be connected more to 
specific issues than to overarching values. However, the main 
problem with the test is that it is very time-consuming, as it does 
not simply evoke attitudes, opinions or behaviour already formed 
but asks respondents to reflect about the value preferences they 
use in their life. Therefore, the administration of this single test 
takes about 15-20 minutes which, given the present costs of a 
national representative sample is considered as prohibitive. The 
test is only used for student samples or in small groups. A 1968 
NORC study done by Rokeach himself is the only published nation­
wide application.
However, in Hungary, the Center for Value Sociology managed to 
ask the Rokeach test on a national representative sample four 
times, in 1978, 1982, 1990 and 1993. The respective sample sizes 
were 807, 2938, 1320 and 1538, with missing values ranging 
around 25%. However, we faced the problem that although we had 
empirical evidence for the Rokeach test for about 5000 
individuals, we lacked comparative data.
The estimation of value types
In order to overcome this deficiency, we came up with the idea of 
estimating the Rokeach values in the other countries of the WVS 
with the help of the Hungarian results. This idea was based on two 
considerations. First, we had a high number of cases and were 
confident that we would be able to do a fairly exhaustive study of 
the test, minimising response error. Second, we were interested in 
classification into types, and our assumption was that in such a 
case, it is more likely that one can get well-behaving estimates 
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The exact derivation of the types is a long and methodologically 
tiresome story, of which we will only give the main outlines. First, 
we derived value or subjectivity types for the Hungarian data, 
using cluster analysis. Because of the exploratory nature of this 
method, we proceeded in several successive steps, analysing first 
the four sample years individually and then, using an initial 
configuration based on these results, we proceeded to an analysis 
of the whole data set. After reviewing several variants, we opted 
for a ten-cluster solution, dividing the whole sample into ten 
value types. Table 1 contains the description of the ten types.
The types thus derived were in line with the factor analysis of the 
data sets, accomplished earlier, and also compatible with our 
theoretical perspective. On this basis, both the instrumental and 
the terminal values can be divided into two broad chains, each 
containing three sets of values, with some overlap. The four chains 
are represented in Tables 2-5. For the terminal values, the first 
chain contained the more abstract goals, consisting of the 
ideological (Enlightenment), the Christian and the ethical (social 
democratic) values (see Table 2), while the second the more 
concrete, mundane sets of traditional, pragmatic-material and 
hedonistic values (Table 3). The instrumental values consisted of 
the chain of the more abstract, active sets, the intellectual, the 
pragmatic and the ethical values (Table 4), and the more passive 
and mundane sets, the traditional-disciplinary, the Christian- 
communitarian and the hedonistic values (Table 5).
A direct combination of the two sets, by pairing the most similar 
sets from each the terminal and instrumental chains, gives us 
immediately six types. Thus, putting together the intellectual and 
the ideological values, we have the Enlightenment rationalist type 
(CL1), and we also can easily construct three further types, the 
ethical social democratic (CL3), the hedonist (CL6) and the 
traditional-disciplinary (CL8) type. We only have problems with 
the remaining two, the Christian and the pragmatic-materialist 
types, as these values change chains in the terminal and 
instrumental values. The reason, however, is not difficult to find. 
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downplayed the traditional communitarian Christian values and 
emphasised pragmatism and material well-being inside an axial 
belief system. As Hungary is a predominantly Catholic country, it 
is not surprising that the remaining two basic types were defined 
as Christian (CL5) and materialist (CL7).
The other four types were variants of the six main types, due to 
the special importance of ideological values in the Hungarian 
sample. In our prior studies, we were already able to establish 
that in the Rokeach test, these are the values of Enlightenment 
rationalism that individuate most the official values of existing 
socialism. These were the values where the population averages 
showed that preference was much higher in Hungary than in the 
US. (7) The internal analysis of the Hungarian data also showed 
that these values were considered to be especially important 
among party members and the better educated, with those who 
attended the special party schools being especially highly 
ideological. (8)
It is the extra presence of the ideological factor that defined the 
remaining four types. First, apart form the opposition between 
Enlightenment rationalist and traditional-disciplinary values, 
there was a type that was not only strongly intellectual, but also 
hostile to ideology. This can be called the "dissenting intellectual" 
(or, in the West, post-Enlightenment) strategy (CL4). The other, 
diametrically opposite type was non-intellectual and traditional- 
communitarian in its instrumental values, but was highly 
ideological. This can be identified as a "socialist petty bourgeois" 
(CL2).
The ideological values also duplicated two other, also diametrically 
opposed strategies, the social democratic and the hedonist. While 
the "classical" social democratic type was hostile to ideology and 
close to Protestant pragmatism, signalling and also characterising 
the old communist-social democrat divide, there was a type 
which, apart from adhering to the central social democratic values, 
was also quite strongly ideologically oriented. Finally, similarly, 
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there was an additional group that was also ideological. We will 
call these types as "ideological social democrat" (CL9) and 
"ideological hedonist" (CLIO). Table 6 contains the summary 
description of the ten types, and also the codes that will be used 
for them in further analysis.
In the second stage, we developed a model to estimate these value 
types for the Hungarian data. We used discriminant analysis, 
trying to distinguish the ten types using variables from the 1990 
WVS. Apart from the Inglehart and the child-rearing tests 
contained in this survey, we used measures of religiosity, 
attitudes with respect to breaking social norms, and some 
questions related to work and politics. In the first stage, we have 
included exploratively all items of the sets in our model, while in 
the second stage, those that proved to be statistically insignificant 
were left out. In order not to lose too many cases, we replaced 
missing values by the respective national averages. In this 
manner, we were able to place correctly 34% of our cases, which, 
taken into the fact that we had ten groups, was quite satisfactory, 
as it meant that, one the average, for each value type, 7% of the 
respondents belonging to the type fell into each of the nine other, 
"wrong" types, while 34% into the correct one.
A comparison of the estimated and the original percentages shows 
a general correspondence, though in a few cases, the differences 
were not negligible (see Table 7). Therefore, we went ahead to 
estimate the types for the other 23 countries. Such a procedure 
has considerable dangers. The usual risks of estimation were 
increased by the fact that missing values again had to be replaced 
by national averages, and that the types were developed for a 
Catholic and former socialist country, often considered a unique 
case, and it is doubtful whether the types are applicable for the 
other countries. The estimates obtained are contained in Table 8.
A first look at the table indicates the face validity of the 
estimates. Thus, the religious type is most prevalent in the still 
strongly religious Catholic countries like Poland, Portugal, Italy or 
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most of the former Communist and the Protestant (especially 
Nordic) countries. In a similar manner, the social democratic type 
is the highest in Czechoslovakia and Sweden, while the ideological 
social democrats and ideological hedonists are most prevalent in 
the former Soviet Union. However, the table contains additional 
points of interest. Thus, the country with by far the smallest 
percentage of social democrats is Hungary', shedding some light on 
the strange collapse of the social democratic party there, or the 
value type that we called "ideological petty bourgeois" was 
especially strong in the Catholic countries, indicating that this 
value type may function there as a post-Catholic value type.
The table could be analysed further, but now we shall proceed on 
a more explanatory' track. Our main research question is to 
establish empirical relationships between patterns of background 
variables and patterns of value types. For this purposes we have 
set up a latent variable model. (10)
The model
The model has two blocks, the first containing the patterns of 
background variables, the second the patterns of value types, and 
the relations refer to the path coefficients leading from the 
background variables to the value types (see the Figure below).
The model is based on theoretical considerations and the 
extensive analysis of the Hungarian data. On the left side of the 
model, concerning the factor structure o f the background 
variables, it assumes that there will be a correlation between 
higher education and city dwelling, forming a modernisation 
background factor, and younger and male respondents, exhibiting 
a higher degree of activity, forming an ascriptive factor. There 
should be a corresponding separation on the right side between 
the value types. One factor is mostly characterised by 
modernisation value differences (Enlightenment rationality and 
ideology), while the second factor is composed of more ascriptive 
value types, influenced by (individual) life-cycle or (socio- 




























































































"direct" path coefficients between the corresponding background 
and value factors, and two "cross" coefficients.
























In line with our theoretical approach, the first basic hypothesis is 
that values, understood as fundamental axial codes governing 
individual conduct, do matter, and in many different ways are 
more important than economic well-being or the level o f 
modernisation. The present structure of the value system should 
be a hierarchical configuration of these axial layers, starting with 
the leftovers of traditional values, continuing with the impact of 
Christianity, then of Protestantism, the Enlightenment, and finally 
of socialism. In particular, we expect that the mark of Communism 
would establish a strong dividing line among the countries, 
comparable to the Catholic-Protestant divide.
Second, not only should values matter, but this would depend on 
their conditions of establishment. An axial moment presupposes 
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absence of such a crisis, a prior dissolution of the ordering codes, 
the imposition of a new axial belief system remains inefficient and 
superficial, will only be experienced as a coercive dictatorship. In 
such countries, resistance to the new ideology should be stronger. 
Thus, those countries where socialism was established at the 
beginning of a world war and not in its aftermath, during the 
general collapse, and where national culture and especially the 
dominant religion remained strong, the impact of socialism must 
be visible different. Thus, we expect that the most specific 
differences compared to the other socialist countries will be 
shown by the Baltic countries, especially Lithuania, and by Poland, 
and not the economically or socially more modernised or 
politically more liberal countries like Hungary , East Germany or 
the former Czechoslovakia. (11)
Third, especially since 1989, there is a lot o f discussion about the 
crisis of our age. One could easily dismiss such concerns as, indeed, 
the idea of crisis is almost contemporaneous with the history' of 
modernity. Still, it would be short-sighted to overlook the signs 
around us. In our theoretical arguments, we redefined history as 
the history' o f axial moments. Our final general concern is the 
question whether, on the basis of our data, we can perceive signs 
of an axial crisis.
Operationalised hypotheses
In order to facilitate the interpretation of results, we will 
formulate our hypotheses separately for the factor loading of the 
two patterns, and then for their relationships, the path 
coefficients.
1. The background pattern
Hypothesis 1. We assume that the relative importance of 
education will be greater than that of urbanisation, as this is the 
most important source of socialisation in modern societies. This 
should be especially pertinent in the former socialist countries, 
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assume that in countries with German type of settlement pattern, 
due to the strong city-town-village differences, urbanisation 
would be also quite important, as opposed to the Latin countries, 
where such differences are much smaller.
Hypothesis 2. We also assume that the relative importance of age 
will be greater than that of gender. However, sex difference 
should still be present in more "backward” countries, where 
traditional patterns survived. Thus, we expect higher gender 
weights in the East European and the Catholic countries, and 
especially where the two considerations intersect, in Poland.
2. The value pattern
Hypothesis 3. The analysis of the Hungarian data showed that the 
value type of Enlightenment rationality and ideology (CL1) was 
the official ideology of socialism. Therefore, we expect that this 
type will play a much higher role in the East than in the West, and 
especially that it will be much more positively correlated with the 
modernisation value factor, while the socialist "petty bourgeoisie" 
type (CL2) should be strongly negatively correlated in the East.
Hypothesis 4. We expect that the coefficients for the religious 
value type (CL5) would be positively correlated with age, 
reflecting the general trend of secularisation, and should be 
especially high for those Catholic countries that are still relatively 
highly religious.
Hypothesis 5. We assume that the coefficients for the materialist 
value type (CL7) should be negatively correlated with age, 
reflecting the simple fact that people in the early stages of their 
career are more concerned with establishing the material 
framework of their existence, and should also be much stronger in 
the former socialist countries, reflecting both differences in the 
level of well-being and the general post-communist mood. 
Similarly, we expect the hedonistic type to be more prevalent 
among the young respondents, but here we assume that the major 
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Protestant differences, with larger age coefficients in the Catholic 
countries, as hedonism is a component of secularisation.
Hypothesis 6. The coefficients for social democratic values should 
be positively correlated with age wherever we can hypothesise a 
decline in the hold of this ideology, and negatively in those 
countries where it was still powerful in 1990. In the first group, 
we can certainly place Sweden, West Germane' and the countries 
of the former Soviet Union, while in the second, some Southern 
and East European countries - the reason being that the distinction 
between social democracy and socialism was much more 
pronounced in the latter countres of the East. Finally, we assume 
that the ideological social democratic type will be much more 
important in East than in West Europe.
3. Path coefficients
Hypothesis 7. Our first assumption about the path coefficients is 
that the model is correctly specified, and that the "direct" path 
coefficients will be higher than the "cross" path coefficients. 
However, this hypothesis should be coloured by the fact that, in 
line with the available evidence, the path coefficients should be 
relatively higher for the modernisational background variables in 
East Europe and for age in West Europe, renecting the strong 
importance of formal schooling under socialism, and the increasing 
relevance of generational differences in the West.
Hypothesis 8. Our final hypothesis is that while we expect that in 
general higher education and younger age will show some 
similarity even after discounting for the higher educational 
attainments of the younger cohorts, in cases of a generational 
conflict, there may be a reversal, approaching the values of the 
better educated and the old. This should be the case of most East 
European countries, where the older generations had much 
stronger allegiances to socialism; of France, reflecting 1968; and 
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Results
Table 9 contains the results of the LVPLS analysis. (12) We will 
first proceed to assess step by step the operational hypotheses, 
and then draw the broader conclusions.
Hypothesis 1. This hypothesis was fully supported by the data. 
(13) In most countries, the coefficient for education was close to 
one, indicating an almost perfect correspondence between this 
variable and the general factor. The urbanisation coefficient, as 
predicted, was small for most of the East and South European 
countries, while high for the North of Europe, except Norway, and 
especially the German-speaking countries, with Austria being the 
only case of the sample where urbanisation proved to be more 
important than education. The low importance of urbanisation in 
Britain is also not surprising, while its high importance for Latvia 
may be due to the special demographic composition of the 
country. (14)
Hypothesis 2. The rather obvious assumptions of this hypothesis 
were also met. In most cases, age proved to be a much more 
important variable in setting up the ascriptive factor than sex. It 
was especially true for the Protestant countries, where the effect 
of gender was negligible. Gender effect was still high, though, in 
the Catholic countries (Spain, Portugal, Austria, and Italy), and in 
East Europe (the exception of Moscow does not count, as in this 
case it mattered that it was only a city' sample). As expected, the 
importance of gender was especially strong in Poland where it 
dominated age. There were three unexpected gender coefficients. 
First, apart from Poland, gender effect was predominant in Latvia 
as well, probably due again to special demographic reasons. 
Second, Norway was the only country where the coefficient was 
negative, indicating that there the value preferences of women 
were more similar to those of the young than the old. Third, 
Sweden was the third country where gender proved to be more 
important than age. The reason why Sweden proved to be an 



























































































-  15 -
The results o f the first two hypotheses were more than 
reinforcements of common knowledge. They rather point out the 
location where certain traditional, pre-axial concerns still 
survived.
Hypothesis 3. The results for the first value set not only confirmed 
our hypothesis, but shed additional light both to the East-West 
and the Catholic-Protestant differences, and even provided 
further support for the closeness between Enlightenment 
rationality' and official socialist ideology. First, most of the socialist 
countries did manifest the expected pattern of factor loading, with 
the coefficients for both CL1 and CL4 being high and positive 
while that of CL2 high and negative. There were exceptions, 
though. First of all Poland showed a completely different pattern, 
very' close that of Portugal and Spain. Second, the East German 
sample behaved here just like the West German one. Third, the 
coefficient for CL2 proved to be positive even for Lithuania. 
Finally, there were minor deviations from the standard pattern 
even for Latvia and Estonia.
Second, there was indeed a very' marked East-West difference in 
the coefficients for the "socialist petty bourgeois" value tyrpe (CL2). 
While in East Europe, just like in the Hungarian pilot study, people 
with a low education were predominant in this ty'pe, the opposite 
was true for most West European countries. The combination of 
accepting the ideological terminal values of the Enlightenment, but 
keeping the instrumental communitarian values of Christianity 
was in Western Europe more characteristic of the better educated 
strata. There were three exceptions: France, the home of classical 
Enlightenment: and two Northern countries, Denmark and Norway.
Third, the strong East European predominance in the coefficients 
for CL1 was matched by' the coefficients of CL4, the non ideological 
intellectual type, where the coefficients for all West European 
countries were very high, again with the exception of France.
The data showed an additional general pattern. Among the West 
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relatively high mostly for the Catholic countries (France, Austria. 
Portugal, Spain), while very low or even negative for the 
Protestant countries (Finland, Norway, Flolland, Britain), with some 
exceptions. This indicates the presence of two different strategies 
for the secularised, better educated strata in the Catholic 
countries: full-scale Enlightenment rationality (CL1) or non- 
ideological (post-Enlightenment) intellectualisation (CL4), while 
for the Protestant countries, the first hardly existed. Even on the 
basis of a study of value preferences done in 1990 it is possible to 
show that the full-scale Enlightenment ideology had little effect in 
the Protestant countries. As we’ll see, the second, and - so far - 
predominant alternative was given there by social democracy.
Hypothesis 4. This hypothesis was fully supported by the data. 
This result is not self-evident. It may well happen in a country 
where religiosity' is high that this value type does not play a major 
role in the manner social background variables define the 
differences in value types. Our results indicate that the decline of 
religiosity' in the younger cohorts is higher in the more religious 
countries, supporting the continuation of secularisation.
Hypothesis 5. This hypothesis was confirmed without any 
exceptions. The coefficient for any East Europeans country, 
including the outliers, Poland and Lithuania, was higher than for 
any West European country, though for all countries, and again 
without exception, it was negative. This shows two things. First, 
the correspondence between material considerations and value 
types is indeed close for the particular segment of the value 
system where such considerations are relevant. Second, the 
Inglehart hypothesis should be qualified. If we do not measure 
attitudes, but basic value orientations by subjectivity types, we 
can observe that materialism is somewhat higher among the 
younger than the older generation, for simple life-cycle reasons.
The coefficients for the hedonistic type, as expected, were also 
negative, with one exception, but the very clear pattern present in 
the data proved to be different from the expectations. In fact, 
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the East. The coefficients for most of the West European countries 
are very high, well above the level of the East European countries, 
though the dividing line here is not as crystal clear. Concerning 
the exceptions, in the East, the positive coefficient of Latvia is 
probably due to the strong gender effect, while the high negative 
one of Moscow is to the special kind of sample (all respondents 
are from a capital). In the West, the low coefficient for Norway is 
probably also due to the gender effect, while the unexpectedly 
lower coefficients for the Catholic countries indicate that in our 
times, hedonism has become more of an alternative to social 
democracy than to religiosity .
Hypothesis 6. About this hypothesis, we first have to remark that 
in the case of the social democratic values, we have a specification 
problem with our model. In general, these values were preferred 
much more by male than female respondents, but due to the 
general collapse of social democracy, its supporters are more 
numerous among the older generations. Therefore, the general 
age-gender relations are reversed. This explains why the factor 
loading of these value types are often rather low.
Concerning the classical social democratic type (CL3), our 
hypothesis stands up most for Sweden, due to the spectacularly 
high drop in this value type among the younger cohorts. Apart 
from Sweden, significant losses are indicated for the Netherlands 
and Denmark - also social democratic strongholds -, and most of 
the former Soviet Union, and somewhat less for West Germany. At 
the opposite pole, among the countries where in 1990 this value 
orientation still appealed for the young males, we indeed found 
countries from the South and East of Europe (Italy, Portugal and 
perhaps Spain; and East Germany and especially Czechoslovakia)
The second part of the hypothesis was confirmed concerning age 
(the only exceptions were the usual outliers, Poland and Sweden), 
but not the assumed, simple East-West pattern. The coefficient 
was indeed high for the countries of the former Soviet Union, and 
low' in the Catholic Western countries, but low also for the other 
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countries. The reason could be that as this value type was a 
combination of the social democratic and the communist values, 
its importance declines wherever either of these value systems 
lost ground in the last decades. This actual loss was higher in the 
former Soviet Union than in the other East European countries, 
and in the Protestant and therefore more social democratic 
Northern countries.
Hypothesis 7. The path coefficients confirmed the specification of 
our model, though much more for East than for the West Europe. 
First, the none of the direct coefficients had the opposite sign, 
except for a negligible reversal for Poland (-.01). Second, with the 
exception of Lithuania, the former Czechoslovakia and especially 
Poland, the "direct" path coefficient were considerably greater in 
the East European countries than the "cross" coefficients. In 
Western Europe, this held true for the ascriptive factor, but in 
general not for education. The only country where the pattern was 
exactly the same as in East Europe was France. Third, the age 
effect was indeed much greater in West than in East Europe.
The two results together show that the straightforward separation 
between the respective background and value sets holds true only 
for the East. However, the general specification of the model was 
still valid for most countries concerning the signs, and also due to 
the huge direct ascriptive effect.
Hypothesis 8. This takes us to our last hypothesis, where we 
assumed a certain reversal of signs in special cases. For our 
theoretical purposes, this was one of the most important parts of 
our analysis, and we were extremely pleased with the results. 
First, apart from the case of Finland (a negligible coefficient of 
-.01), there were two countries where the path coefficient of the 
modernisation background factor on the life cycle was positive, 
Britain and Sweden. The case of Sweden has confirmed our 
expectations that due to the substantive loss of social democratic 
values there, the values of older people, against the general 
tendency, were much closer to those of the better educated. A 
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generation conflict at the heart of the social value system there. 
This may be a significant finding as, if Sweden was the forerunner 
of social democracy, Britain was twice the leader in the social 
spread of the reformation (the break with Rome in the 16th and 
Puritanism in the 17th centuries).
The same reversal occurred in the most "typical" East European 
countries, and almost completely in the manner predicted by our 
general hypothesis. The reversal was present at the heart of the 
former Soviet Union (Russia, Moscow, Belarus), and in those East 
European countries that did not have an exceptional status in 
terms of axial resistance (Bulgaria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia). 
However, in the Baltic countries and in Poland, the reversal was 
not present, indicating that wherever the legitimacy of the Soviet 
regime was always dubious, the collapse of the system did not 
lead to a generation conflict. (14) Finally, the only Western 
country' showing the same pattern was again France, indicating 
the retreat of classical Enlightenment rationalism in its birthplace 
to the better educated segments of the older generations.
Conclusion
After a review of the operationalised hypotheses, we can now 
turn back to our general theoretical concerns.
1. Our results showed that values do indeed matter. They have 
their own patterns that do not simply follow differences in 
economic well being or of other modernisation attainments. A 
strong correlation exists between value types that have particular 
affinity with well-being, materialism and the general happiness 
principle, but in most areas of the value system, these are the 
axial belief systems that act as the structuring force of the value 
system. As for the rest, the major structuring differences were the 
marks left by Protestantism and Communism.
2. As opposed to some arguments to the contrary, we were able to 
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countries in value preferences do not follow the pattern of 
political and economic development, but are dominated by two 
axial concerns: the survival of an axial belief system that was able 
to oppose Communism (Poland), and a permanent hostility to 
Communism due to the fact that it was established solely by 
external force, and not in an axial moment (the Baltic countries, 
especially Lithuania). This leads to the rather surprising result 
that the four countries of the sample that never differed from the 
standard post-Communist pattern w'ere Russia, Belarus, Bulgaria 
and Hungary; while, even more significantly, the only Western 
country that, at least for the modernisation half of the model, 
exhibited the same pattern was France. Similarly, the differences 
within the West European value systems had nothing to do with 
different levels of modernisation or well-being, but solely with 
axial concerns: survivals of the Catholic-Protestant divide, the 
presence of Enlightenment rationalism, and finally the additional 
impact of social democracy.
3. Our final, and most controversial, theoretical idea concerned the 
recognition and identification of our age as a moment of axial 
crisis. Though one could assert that such a claim is impossible to 
substantiate, and especially not with the techniques of survey 
questionnaires, our results do strongly indicate that we are 
entering an axial moment. According to our data, all the basic axial 
systems of belief are in retreat, moreover - and indeed this may 
be the most significant result of our overview - each is so 
especially in its main strongholds, often accompanied by 
generation conflicts. Thus, religiosity is lower among the younger 
generation everywhere than among the old, but it is especially so 
in the still highly religious areas. Enlightenment ideology and 
rationality is mostly on the retreat today in France, its birthplace. 
The official socialist value system is collapsing in the former East 
Europe, while the social democratic value system is collapsing in 
Sweden. Finally, evident generation conflicts are present even in 
the value system of England, the home basis of Puritanism and 
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However, one could object that if some values are in retreat, it is 
in the nature o f things - and also follows from our technique of 
analysis - that other values should come forward. This objection 
requires two comments. First, our results showed that all axial 
belief systems are now in decline together, and that this decline is 
concentrated on the former strongholds. Second, our results 
confirmed the trend that all that is new bears on itself the tag 
"post" (post-industrial, postmaterialist, postmodern, post-Fordist, 
postcommunist, etc.). The value types gaining ground are the 
"post-Enlightenment" individualistic-intellectual value type (CL4), 
the "post-religious" value type (CL2), the "post-communist” 
materialist value type (CL7); and finally simple hedonism (CL6).
Our age has often been characterised, and happily, as the end of 
ideology. It seems, however, that these are not simply the global, 
all-encompassing, macro-level Ideologies that are vanishing, but 
those axial techniques and beliefs that were the foundations of 
our civilisation, and that were located not in the Durkheimian and 
Marxian macro societal level, but at the level o f individual 
subjects, aiming to give them spiritual strength in times of 
distress. All that has remained today of these techniques is 
individualistic rationalism and hedonism. The source of strength 
and security has been transferred from the individual itself to the 
taken for granted rational automatisms of the economic, social and 
political subsystems. It is a matter of the future to see how long 
these automatisms, these "palliatives" (the word is from Sismondi) 
of the welfare state and the mixed economy will be able to thwart 
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Notes
( 1 ) Seen today, the list may contain some peculiarities. However, 
at the time of the survey, East and West Germane were still 
separate countries, and the separate handling was important also 
for theoretical reasons; Czechoslovakia was still unified, and it was 
not possible to divide the sample due to its size; while the 
investigators decided to create a separate sample for Moscow.
(2) About the axial age, see Karl Jaspers, The Origin and Goal of 
History (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1953), Lewis 
Mumford, The Transformations of Man (N.Y., Collier, 1956), and S. 
N. Eisenstadt (ed.) The Origins and Diversity o f Axial Age 
Civilisations (N.Y., State University of New York Press, 1986).
(3) In the timing and interpretation of the event, we rely largely 
on the work of the Hungarian thinker, Béla Hamvas, who wrote 
about the phenomenon before Jaspers, and gave a slightly 
different reading. See Béla Hamvas, Scientia Sacra (Budapest, 
Magvetô, 1988, 2nd ed Szentendre, Medio, 1995) [1943-44]. 
Concerning the coexistence, see the practical contemporaneity of 
Buddha (560-483) in India, Confucius (551-479) in China, and 
Heraclitus (550-480) in Greece.
(4) It is important to note that both Weber and Foucault had an 
identical and largely unexplained turn in their last, most mature 
period toward axial religions and philosophies, though none of 
them used the concept. For Weber, see his Collected Essays on the 
Sociology of Religions, including the studies on China, India and 
Ancient Israel; for Foucault, see the published volumes two and 
three of the History of Sexuality and the lectures given at the 
Collège de France between 1980 and 1984 about Greek and 
Roman philosophy and Early Christianity', unpublished in writing 
but available in tape at the Foucault Archives .
(5) On cluster analysis, see Everitt, Brian, Cluster Analysis 
(London, Heinemann, 1984), and Aldenderfer, Mark S. and 
Blashfield, Roger K., Cluster Analy sis (Beverly Hills, Sage, 1984).
(6) See Milton Rokeach, The Nature o f Human Values (N.Y., The 
Free Press, 1973).
(7) See Elemér Hankiss, Robert Manchin, Laszlo Füstôs, and 
Arpâd Szakolczai, "Continuity and Break; the Analysis of the Value 
System of Hungarian Society, 1930-1978". Research report, 
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(8) See Arpad Szakolczai, 'On the characteristics of the value 
choices of students', in Ildiko Hrubos (ed.), The Social Conditions of 
Engineers and Economists (Budapest, Department of Sociology, 
University of Economics, 1987).
(9) The reason why the two Irelands had to be left out was that 
due to the high degree of religiosity, its value system was too 
distant from all the other countries. This finding supports our 
previous consideration about the special case of Ireland, the 
absence of influential and convincing terrorist ideological and 
absolutist impact.
(10) About LISREL, see J. Scott Long, Covariance Structure Models: 
an introduction to LISREL (Beverly Hills, Sage, 1983).
(11) For an opposite perspective, see William M. Reisinger, Arthur 
H. Miller, Vicki L. Hesli and Kirsten Hill Maher, 'Political Values in 
Russia, Ukraine and Lithuania: Sources and Implication for 
Democracy', British Journal o f Political Science 24 (1994), 2: 183- 
223.
(12) Because the value types are dichotomous variables, it was 
not possible to use LISREL modelling proper, as the maximum 
likelihood estimates assume normality, and used the LVPLS 
method, a very robust programme using partial OLS estimates. In 
fact, the estimation of the model was quite precarious, as the 
Rokeach types were not only dichotomous variables, but had 
highly skewed distribution, and membership in one of the types 
implied a value o f 0 for all the others. Therefore, any direct 
correlation between the value types was spurious, and was 
replaced with a zero in the correlation matrix. Consequently, the 
factor loading of the value types are purely based on similarities 
in the pattern of relationship with the background variables. 
Furthermore, in some countries where very few respondents 
belonged to CL8, the model became unstable. Therefore, for 
comparative purposes, all coefficients of the final model are from 
runs excluding CL8. Nevertheless, for information, we have 
reinserted the available coefficients for CL8 into the table.
(13) In some countries, unfortunately no codes were available for 
urbanisation.
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Tables
Table 1. The ten value types
Type Values preferred
well above average
CL1 peace, equality, national
securin', freedom, imaginative. 
logical, responsible, courageous, 
capable, broad-minded
CL2 peace, equality, national
security, freedom, obedient, 
forgiving, polite, self-control
CL3 accomplishment, self-respect, 
social recognition, friendship, 
capable, helpful, self-control 
responsible
CL4 inner harmony, wisdom, love, 
self-respect, beaut) , logical. 
imagivative. intellectual, 
broadminded
CL5 salvation, forgiving, loving, 
ovedient, helpful, polite, 
clean, cheerful, honest, peace
CL6 exciting life, pleasure, love, 
happiness, comfortable life, 
cheerful, loving, clean, polite
CL7 comfortable life, happiness,
national security', independent, 
capable, imaginative, logical, 
intellectual, peace, love
CL8 happiness, family security, 
peace, love, national security, 




comfortable life, polite, 
happiness, cheerful, 
obedient, clean, loving, 
forgiving





peace, national security, 
love, loving, clean, polite, 
happiness, pleasure, 
cheerful
national security, peace, 
equality, comfortable life, 
obedient, forgiving, clean, 
polite, ambitious




national security, peace, 
equality, freedom, self- 
control, responsible
equality, forgiving. 
helpful, obedient, polite, 
loving, freedom, self- 
respect, social recognition
social recognition, capable 
imaginative, intellectual, 
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CL9 social recognition, equality, 
peace, national security, 
honest, helpful, broad­
minded, responsible
CLIO peace, national security, 
freedom, comfortable life, 
cheerful, clean, polite, 
loving
comfortable life, pleasure, 
happiness, exciting life, 
friendship, cheerful, for­
giving, loving.imaginative
social recognition, inner 
harmony .accomplishment, 
equality, responsible, self 
control, obedient
Note: especially huge differences from average were underlined 
Table 2, The abstract chain of terminal values





Table 3. The mundane chain of terminal values
Traditional Material Hedonistic




Table 4, The abstract chain of instrumental values
Rational-mental Pragmatic Ethical
INTELLECTUAL CAPABLE COURAGEOUS HONEST
IMAGINATIVE BROADMINDED RESPONSIBLE 
LOGICAL INDEPENDENT SELF-CONTROLLED
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Table 6. Summary description of the value types
CL1 Enlightenment rationalist (official socialist)
CL2 socialist petty bourgeois (in the West, post-religious)
CL3 classical social democratic





CL9 ideological social democrat
CLIO ideological hedonist
Table 7. The original and estimated distribution of value types in 
Hungary (in %)
CL1 CL2 CL3 CL4 CL5 CL6 CL7 CL8 CL9 C110
Orig 9.1 5.8 4.8 10.5 13.8 15.0 15.6 7.7 6.3 9.7
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Table 8. The estimated distribution of value types in 26 countries
CL1 CL2 CL3 CL4 CL5 CL6 CL7 CL8 CL9 C110
Rus 5.2 11.1 21.4 7.8 6.4 6.7 7.5 .9 19.3 13.7
Nlos 5.1 5.9 24.7 12.3 4.8 9.1 11.7 1.7 13.6 11.1
Bela 6.1 5.2 23.8 5.8 6.1 7.2 11.5 1.3 20.4 12.5
Esto 10.2 2.9 26.8 9.8 3.4 7.0 14.3 1.9 13.1 10.6
Latv 13.5 4.2 27.9 10.9 4.4 6.2 16.4 1.9 5.5 9.1
Lith 15.3 8.2 21.2 8.0 12.1 7.3 7.5 4.7 3.3 12.4
Bulg 10.7 13.2 15.7 12.2 6.0 8.6 11.3 2.0 9.4 10.9
Hun 10.3 8.5 8.3 9.1 14.4 8.2 10.0 13.3 8.9 9.1
CS 3.6 16.4 33.7 1.5 12.0 11.7 3.7 .8 3.1 13.6
PL 3.4 11.8 14.7 7.1 30.8 34.3 2.9 1.5 1.3 2.1
E-G 24.1 6.4 21.9 11.9 7.6 6.5 9.5 2.5 5.7 4.0
W-G 12.9 13.6 20.7 13.7 9.6 11.6 8.9 1.4 2.1 5.6
Ostr 17.0 8.2 23.8 10.8 15.1 7.5 5.2 2.9 3.3 6.2
Finl 7.0 13.8 12.9 13.1 6.1 19.4 8.8 1.4 4.4 13.1
Swe 11.6 1.5 28.4 17.8 3.4 12.6 3.6 .7 14.6 5.8
Nor 16.1 4.0 16.3 23.3 10.6 6.7 7.7 .8 6.7 7.8
Den 12.8 2.5 21.3 17.9 7.5 15.4 10.2 1.7 5.3 5.4
Hoi 8.3 22.0 17.3 14.4 9.2 11.7 7.2 .4 3.0 6.5
Brit 8.2 4.3 18.4 10.7 17.2 11.9 6.3 3.7 8.7 10.6
N-lr 7.6 4.3 10.9 6.9 50.0 4.3 1.6 3.0 7.9 3.6
Irel 6.4 3.1 12.5 6.3 55.5 3.9 1.8 2.9 2.3 5.3
Belg 2.9 23.6 17.1 9.0 16.3 12.0 5.3 2.1 3.8 7.9
Spa 3.8 10.3 13.0 17.1 24.7 12.1 3.6 4.6 5.4 5.4
Port 1.8 20.7 14.7 7.2 30.6 5.6 2.0 5.7 9.1 2.7
Ita 3.6 14.6 26.6 9.1 25.0 5.9 4.6 2.8 3.9 4.0
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A. Terminal values
1. A COMFORTABLE LIFE (a prosperous life)
2. A WORLD OF PEACE (free of war and conflict)
3. HAPPINESS (contentedness)
4. WISDOM (a mature understanding of life)
5. FAMILY SECURITY (taking care of the loved ones)
6. INNER HARMONY (freedom from inner conflict)
7. EQUALITY (brotherhood, equal opportunity for all)
8. A SENSE OF ACCOMPLISHMENT (lasting contribution)
9. AN EXCITING LIFE (a stimulating, active life)
10. NATIONAL SECURITY (protection from attack)
11. TRUE FRIENDSHIP (close companionship)
12. MATURE LOVE (sexual and spiritual intimacy)
13. PLEASURE (an enjoyable, leisurely life)
14. SELF-RESPECT (self-esteem)
15. FREEDOM (independence, free choice)
16. A WORLD OF BEAUTY (beauty of nature and the art)
17. SOCIAL RECOGNITION (respect, admiration)
18. SALVATION (saved, eternal life)
B. Instrumental values
19. IMAGINATIVE (daring, creative)
20. COURAGEOUS (standing up for your beliefs)
21. BROADMINDED (open-minded)
22. OBEDIENT (dutiful, respectful)
23. INTELLECTUAL (intelligent, reflexive)
24. SELF-CONTROLLED (restrained, self-disciplined)
25. RESPONSIBLE (dependable, reliable)
26. CAPABLE (competent, effective)
27. CHEERFUL (lighthearted, joyful)
28. LOGICAL (consistent, rational)
29. FORGIVING (willing to pardon others)
30. INDEPENDENT (self-reliant, self-sufficient)
31. HELPFUL (working for the welfare of others)
32. HONEST (sincere, truthful)
33. LOVING (affectionate, tender)
34. CLEAN (neat, tidy)
35. AMBITIOUS (hard-working, aspiring)
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